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Abstract
This paper was first presented at the International Sports Law Conference in The Hague in October 2018. It summarises 
the author’s work and wider research on the introduction of new proposals for the regulation of football intermediaries (a 
term which the author finds unworkable and unorthodox). The author’s research critically analyses the current regulatory 
framework and identifies the elements that form the basis for the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the regulations currently 
in force. With the use of case studies and examples drawn from the author’s private practice, recommendations are produced 
for new regulations that would promote transparency, equality and consistency. The author concludes that this can only be 
achieved via a blending of self-regulation and external regulation at an international setting.
Keywords Sports law · Football law · Agents · Regulation · Arbitration
1 Introduction
It is more often than not when a high-profile football dispute 
(or allegation therein) sees the public light. It is arguable that 
the enormous commodification of the game, along with the 
considerable and undisputed increase in the use of social 
media (and their impact on public opinion), has created 
an inevitable framework of open public discussion, where 
ideas, opinions and criticism are exchanged. Such open dis-
cussion regularly highlights the role of football agents and, 
inevitably, focuses on the ability, or otherwise, of governing 
bodies to regulate properly and appropriately, the business 
of football agency.
1.1  The background
There is one aspect that the author needs to clarify before 
he proceeds with the analysis of the present work. Through-
out the present analysis, the author will respectfully use the 
term ‘agent,’ as opposed to the term ‘intermediary.’ In the 
author’s opinion, the term ‘intermediary’ does not fully 
describe the actual work done by many professionals in this 
business. It does not also describe and afford the recognition 
that some of them must receive for their enormous contribu-
tion to the game as a whole and to their individual clients. 
As the author states above, the term is unworkable and unor-
thodox and FIFA must respectfully consider the immediate 
withdrawal of such term.
In addition, the author possesses over 15 years of expe-
rience in representing players at the highest level and he 
has been involved in a number of difficult and complicated 
transactions. Such transactions allowed the author to expe-
rience and appreciate the different dynamics operating in 
the market and the numerous ways by which football agents 
deal with certain situations. It has also allowed the author 
to appreciate that, sometimes, such dynamics are disguised 
and well hidden. It is because of the author’s involvement, 
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in this market, that he can appreciate the limitations of self-
regulation and he is hoping that the present work will inform 
and strengthen this important area of football law, within the 
wider discipline of sports law.
Further, it is also important to underline the actual prob-
lems/issues with the regulation of football agents and justify 
the premise for the present research and work. In doing so, 
the author hopes that the readers shall be able to appreciate 
the significance of this area of regulation, not only for the 
discipline of sports law, but for society too.
The role of a football agent in modern society is multi-
faceted, and it cannot be limited only to negotiations leading 
to the transfer of a player between two clubs. If done appro-
priately and in a professional manner, it requires the agent 
to perform a series of different functions such as scouting, 
counselling, assistance with financial/tax services, evalua-
tion and execution of image rights and the securing of spon-
sorship/marketing opportunities. Such functions are largely 
unknown, at least to the public, but they play an important 
role towards maximisation of the player’s commercial and 
employment opportunities.
There are, however, other situations that may lead football 
agents to proceed with unethical and illegal practices and 
such situations remain secret, unless there is media expo-
sure.1 It is these situations that, when exposed, create an 
environment of distrust among the stakeholders and particu-
larly among the public. Our research indicates that a large 
segment of practicing football agents wishes such illegal 
and unethical practices to be eradicated, whereas the public 
feel that unscrupulous (unlicensed and unregulated) agents 
damage the image of sport. The author represented several 
football agents before disciplinary hearings, either before 
The FA’s Rule K Arbitration, or at other jurisdictions, where 
allegations of tapping up, contractual breaches and/or incite-
ment to commit such breaches were presented. It is remark-
able that in almost half of the cases the author had the oppor-
tunity to deal with, the allegations concerned football agents 
who were unlicensed (or unauthorised to deal with specific 
players) and in one-third of them, the agents concerned did 
not really understand the professional responsibility that 
applied to them. In some of those cases, it was clear that the 
advice offered by those agents to players was damaging, as 
basic principles of contract law and/or employment law were 
ignored, with the result to cause the players to be bound by 
an employment contract of a considerable duration, which 
contained several provisions that were not beneficial to the 
player. In the same number of cases, it was also evident that 
the concerned agents did not really understand or appreciate 
professional ethics, nor did they have an intention of apply-
ing such ethics. In some other cases, several players were 
approached by third-party agents and were persuaded to 
breach their existing player–agent mandate of representation. 
The damage and the loss to the complainant agent (or player) 
in such situations were irreversible and contributed to the 
argument that unregulated and unscrupulous agents have no 
place in this discipline. In one of our interviews conducted 
with one of the current Premier League managers, the com-
ment was: ‘I do not like dealing with any of them (agents). 
They are parasites, vermin of the worse kind and I have no 
time for them. Go no further, this is the Wild West.’2 Another 
Premier League manager declared: ‘I have dealt with over 50 
agents in the last three years and I am still waiting to meet a 
decent one. Many of them, if not all of them, have their own 
interests at heart, not their clients.’ They seek a quick profit 
and in order for them to get it, they will step on bodies. They 
are all mafiosos.’ In addition (and further to the evidence in 
Footnote 1), there are several other situations that give rise 
to allegations of tapping up, bungs, tax evasion and many 
more activities that centre around the practices of football 
agents. All these situations have the potential of damaging 
the image of sport and creating a reputational risk for the 
different stakeholders in the sport.
It is submitted that evidence to this effect could only help 
one to appreciate the level of dissatisfaction expressed by 
mane stakeholders in this area. Whether this is a legal prob-
lem or an ethical one (or both), it can be submitted that 
the damage the sport suffers must be measured against the 
significance of sport for society. Such significance cannot be 
underestimated, nor can it be dismissed at face value. This 
significance is understood by self-regulation, but it is more 
often than not, that its governance fails its participants and 
other stakeholders. This is true in the area of regulation of 
football agents, which, at the moment, appears to be at its 
lowest since its inception. The analysis in the present work 
clearly identifies ‘deregulation’ as one of the two major fac-
tors of the present problematic situation, whereas the second 
factor relates to the lack of appropriate sanctions against 
those who violate the current regulatory framework (where 
applicable).
Following from the arguments above, one may question 
the necessity for the discipline of sports law to look deeper 
into this area of regulation. In other words, why does the 
area of football agents deserve such special enquiry? The 
answer to such question may allow the reader to elicit the 
significant problems in the regulation of football agents. 
Firstly, the enormous amounts of money that relate to the 
1 See, for example, the inquiry by Smith & Lord Stevens https ://
www.thegu ardia n.com/footb all/2007/jun/15/newss tory.bolto nwand 
erers and the BBC Panorama investigation http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
progr ammes /panor ama/53637 02.stm.
2 Interviews with current premier league managers were conducted 
in May–July 2018.
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transfers of professional football agents create an attractive 
environment of employment where any individual (without 
skills and/or relevant qualifications) can enter and make a 
profit. The evidence discussed in this work clearly indicates 
that unskilled and untrained agents may cause severe legal 
problems for their clients and/or other agents, particularly on 
issues of contract law and/or employment law. Secondly, the 
relative ease by which individuals can enter (and perform) 
the profession of a football agent and the current deregula-
tion of such profession, create, as already stated, ethical and 
legal problems. An open profession, without regulation and 
with an attractive and quick remuneration, attracts all sorts. 
Thirdly, the lack of appropriate sanctions, where regulatory 
violations occur, contributes significantly to the perpetual 
existence of the issue and damages the image of sport. The 
last point has enormous significance for the justification of 
the argument that the legitimacy of self-regulation and gov-
ernance is severely dented.
2  Methodology
The present work combined qualitative and quantitative 
methods of research, over a period of 28 months. Qualita-
tive methodology allowed us to understand human behaviour 
from the respondents’ perspective, and data were collected 
through interviews and other methods of observation. This, 
in essence, provided us with an opportunity to understand 
how the respondents perceive their environment and, con-
sequently, how they see social realities that connect with 
their own environment. We interviewed ten football man-
agers from each of the six different countries in which the 
research took place,3 ten professional players and ten agents. 
The interviews were unstructured, with open questions, and 
this created an interpretive environment.
On the other hand, our quantitative research focused on 
a closed-ended questions survey, conducted in the same six 
countries. The respondents were registered football agents, 
and the responses were collected by our research team on 
an anonymous basis. The data collected and subsequently 
analysed can be described as accurate, concise and clear. 
The six countries were chosen because of their numerical 
supremacy (save for Greece where the data were smaller) 
and the concentration of football finances data/principles. 
For example, the ‘big five’4 European leagues generated 
€14.7bn (£12.6bn) in 2016/17, as opposed to €8.4bn in 
2010/11 (Deloitte 2016 and 2011). In addition, the total 
wage costs of the ‘big five’ leagues generated €8.5bn in 
2016–2017, an increase by 4% (Deloitte 2018).5 Finally, 
player-transfer expenditure by Premier League clubs, for 
example, produced a record of £1.6bn in the 2016/-2017 
season. This expenditure created a larger share for the agents 
too, producing £174 m on fees paid to them (Deloitte 2018).
The interviews were conducted personally by the author, 
by utilising his contacts and colleagues in the players’ trans-
fer market, whereas the survey was sent (via email) to those 
agents who are registered in the aforementioned leagues. At 
this juncture, we would like to extend our appreciation to 
the football associations who kindly provided us with the 
necessary and relevant details. Such assistance allowed us to 
commence our project and enabled us to collect and evaluate 
the necessary data. In terms of the quantitative data collected 
from the survey, we succeeded in contacting 3089 registered 
agents in the relevant six leagues. This represents a 44% of 
the entire agents’ population around the world.
The survey focused on two different sections, where in 
Section I the background of the agents was analysed, such as 
education, experience and knowledge of the market, whereas 
Section II concentrated on fifteen major questions, leading 
us to answers that were important for the identification of 
those roots that create inconsistency and arbitrariness in the 
effective regulation of football agents. In summary, we pro-
duce five questions here (from Section II) that are relevant 
to the aims of the research:
1. Do you fully understand the FIFA Regulations on Inter-
mediaries?
2. Do you have knowledge of Contract Law and/or Employ-
ment Law?
3. Do you hold a valid mandate of representation with your 
clients?
4. Do you follow the recommended 3% benchmark fee sug-
gested by FIFA on relevant commission?
5. If the answer to Question 4 is ‘No,’ what is the reason 
for not following the 3% benchmark?6
We were very pleased with the number of responses we 
received, as we sent out 3089 invitations and we received 
2245 responses. This represents a very solid 72.6% of 
answers, giving, therefore, our research statistical probity, 
which enabled us to confirm and accurately evaluate our 
findings. This was in line with our initial aim to create an 
experiential knowledge process, by incorporating discipli-
nary and discursive practices, in order for us to understand 
the relevant field of endeavour (Cetina 1999; Latour and 
3 UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Greece.
4 UK, Germany, France, Spain, Italy.
5 Annual Review of Football Finance 2018, Deloitte.
6 Four choices for the answer were provided to the respondents, in 
relation to Question 5: a. Too low, b. Everybody else does the same, 
c. It is not mandatory, d. I don’t know.
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Woolgar 1986). This process was important for our research 
as this is a highly unregulated area, within the wider dis-
cipline of sports law, and it was important for the author 
to confirm (or counter) the existing knowledge in conjunc-
tion with the actual reality. When reality comes into being, 
knowledge becomes accurate and comprehensive and the 
data collected confirmed three different issues:
a. There is an unregulated environment which allows 
unethical and unscrupulous activities, with the result to 
create an undisputed reputational risk against football 
agents, players and other stakeholders in the sport.
b. The uncontrollable commodification of the game of foot-
ball (in conjunction with the lack of adequate regulation) 
and the unmonitored financial rewards diminish the abili-
ties of self-regulation and damage the image of sport.
c. The lack of appropriate action (sanction) against per-
petrators weakens any arguments for the continuation 
of the autonomy of sport and its governance by self-
regulation.
These issues are all analysed in great detail below, but it 
is first of all necessary to outline the previous and current 
regulations, so the reader can appreciate the problems that 
make the need for the present work relevant, necessary and 
imperative.
3  The previous regulations
Although the representation of football players by agents 
may be traced back to the early years of the introduction 
of football as a regulated sport, it was not until 1994 when 
FIFA7 decided to create the Players’ Agents Regulations, 
to regulate the activities of such individuals. In their first 
format, such regulations created strict licensing criteria and 
placed a burden on clubs and players to engage only agents 
that possessed a valid licence. Pre-requisites for the issuance 
of the licence included a ‘clean’ criminal record and a bank 
guarantee of 200 k Swiss Francs (in the form of a deposit).
In 1999, the European Commission was called upon to 
investigate complaints (brought forward by football agents) 
based on allegations of restrictions to the market, discrimi-
nation on citizenship and lack of remedies on decisions 
re-entered by disciplinary bodies.8 The EC issued a state-
ment of objections,9 following an investigation into the 
allegations. FIFA decided to respond to such objections and, 
with the introduction of the 2001 Players’ Agent Regula-
tions, removed some of the restrictions. It retained, however, 
the regulations that concerned the ability of natural persons 
only to hold a licence, and it also created an amendment 
which authorised national associations to issue licences to 
agents registered with them. At the same time, FIFA re-
enforced (into its regulatory framework) the requirement 
of the ‘impeccable reputation’ to be applied to those who 
wished to obtain a licence and it further introduced an 
examination which tested the applicant’s knowledge on the 
law that related to football. Although the French agent Piau 
continued to challenge the validity/legality of these regula-
tions, the General Court10 confirmed that FIFA Regulations 
do not violate EU competition law.11 In doing so, the Court 
took the opportunity to state that FIFA may impose qualita-
tive restrictions on agents, an argument which meets with 
the author’s agreement and, upon which, much of the pre-
sent work is based. In addition, and on a point, which is of 
immense importance to the present work, the Court refused 
to assess the legal basis of FIFA’s ability to regulate agents, 
but it took the opportunity to state that FIFA displays no 
abuse of a dominant position (on this point), particularly 
where there is an absence of state control, in the form of 
external regulation.12
The above may help the reader appreciate that there have 
been many attempts by FIFA, over the years, to regulate 
the activity of football agents. The decision to regulate such 
activity may also form a determinative, persuasive and com-
prehensive indicator towards the argument that such is the 
importance of this activity, as well as its size and impact on 
the relevant market that some kind of regulation must be in 
place. Three major revisions have taken place in the last few 
years (2006, 2008 and 2015), testament to the complexity 
and the speed by which such market moves. FIFA has not 
been laconic in its production of the relevant regulations, 
but the last revision (2015), which gives emphasis to the 
present applicable regulations, has identified a considerable 
degree of deregulation and forced FIFA to assume the role 
of Pontius Pilate.
Although FIFA must accept its share of responsibility 
and acknowledge that there is a major problem with the 
regulation of football agents, some responsibility must also 
7 The world’s governing body for the game of football.
8 Complaints were brought forward by Multiplayers International 
Denmark and the French football agent Laurent Piau.
9 The commission stated that the prohibition against unlicensed 
agents and the exclusion of legal persons from representing players, 
may fall foul of competition law.
10 Former European Court of First Instance.
11 Case T-193/02 Laurent Piau v Commission of the European Com-
munities [2005] ECR II-209. On appeal, the European Court of Jus-
tice also upheld the General Court’s decision, see: Case C-171/05 P, 
Laurent Piau v Commission of the European Communities, Order of 
the Court (Third Chamber) of 23 February 2006, ECR 2006 I-37.
12 Although this position may still be valid, it is worth noting that 
several Member States in the EU now have sport specific legislation 
to cover and regulate the activities of football agents.
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be directed towards the different and numerous stakehold-
ers that operate in the same market, be it sporting officials, 
clubs, dispute resolution fora (at national level) and so on. 
FIFA recognises that it is potentially difficult and inevitably 
certain for it to conclude that it cannot regulate agents at an 
international stage, but FIFA must also accept that its role 
(the secret is in its title), leaves no room for any other option. 
In conjunction with this, FIFA must also accept that without 
the assistance of external regulation (state authorities and/
or law enforcement agencies), it cannot possibly expect an 
elimination of the problem it is currently facing.
Having said that, one must query the root of the prob-
lem, regarding the regulation of football agents and attempt 
to elicit, with constructive criticism, the attempts made by 
FIFA, over the years, to tackle the problem with appropriate 
means and efforts. Our research indicates that there have 
been many factors for the dramatic increase in the number of 
practising agents. The case of Bosman13 inevitably formed 
the basis for such dramatic increase, as the free movement 
of persons has created commercial and employment oppor-
tunities that maximised the potential of synergies between 
agents and players.14 On this point, it is worth noting the 
significance of football agents in scouting and recruitment 
of young talented players, which, in essence, replaced the 
status quo of a club as a primary source of scouting (Magee 
2002; Poli 2010). From the author’s experience and practice 
in this area, there are situations where the power shifts from 
a club to an agent, in that the agent has the ability to control 
(subject to resources and networks) not only the availability 
of talented players worldwide, but also to access financial 
information on salaries, bonuses and so on, with the result 
of being in a position of power to negotiate more lucrative 
contracts for his/her clients. Our research, however, also 
indicates that it is not Bosman alone that allowed for such 
dramatic increase in football agents. Although Bosman was 
certainly the catalyst towards expansion of the market, nev-
ertheless, our research shows that there are two other fun-
damental aspects responsible for such increase: firstly, the 
relative ease by which agents can now enter the market (and 
consequently approach and advise clients) and the quick 
and, to a certain extent, unaccounted remuneration they can 
receive. Such aspects make the market extremely attractive 
and confirm the fact that the commodification of the game 
may be the underline reason of the problem.
The first argument clearly illustrates the ‘open door’ 
policy that currently exists. FIFA does not impose licens-
ing restrictions on football agents (as the system of registra-
tion has now passed on to national federations), although 
some jurisdictions, such as Belgium, still require agents to 
possess a valid licence. This considerable deregulation by 
FIFA is an element of concern and it explains the statistical 
and empirical evidence currently in force, which shows an 
increase in the number of football agents, in several different 
national jurisdictions. In England, for example, the freedom 
to become a football agent is unlimited (and considerably 
unrestricted), as long as the applicant possesses an ‘impec-
cable reputation,’ no criminal record and no conflict of inter-
est.15 In conjunction with this argument, the reader would be 
interested in the premise that there are also no educational 
qualifications restrictions, although it is fair to say that our 
research indicates that 68% of those who responded to our 
survey hold a university degree (only 12% hold a law degree 
and 27% have knowledge of law-related subjects), 23% hold 
a Master’s degree, whereas a 5% are at a Doctorate level.
The second argument, which illustrates largely the attrac-
tiveness of the profession of a football agent, forms the 
determinative factor for the escalation in the number of foot-
ball agents. There is an escalation on agents’ fees (in their 
overall remuneration), and clubs, in particular, are prepared 
to splash on agents’ fees to ensure they sign their player of 
preference. Although the quality of the player would deter-
mine the negotiating power of an agent, clubs, nevertheless, 
are prepared to remunerate the agent by meeting, sometimes, 
his/her exorbitant requests, in order for them to secure the 
services of the player.
The statistical analysis of four seasons (2014–2018) in 
the English Premier League, for example, shows a dramatic 
increase in the remuneration of football agents, among the 
so-called big-six clubs in the league. The agents’ fees almost 
doubled, for such clubs, from 2014 to 2018. In addition, 
the trend does not maintain national boundaries, but rather 
it has the potential of worldwide expansion. For example, 
since 2013, a total of 69,505 international transfers occurred 
worldwide, whereas 19.7% of those transfers (13,672) 
involved at least one agent. In 47.8% of such transfers, where 
there is a transfer fee, there is at least one agent acting either 
for one of the clubs or for the player. From January 2013 to 
13 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v 
Jean-Marc Bosman C-415/93, European Court of Justice.
14 Although there are several competent and able football agents, 
there are also, regrettably, several unskilled and untrained agents, 
who enter the market with the sole intention of making a quick profit. 
The European Commission may feel that entry restrictions to individ-
uals have the potential of violating EU competition law; however, the 
European Commission has also acknowledged in the Piau case that 
it is important for a regulator to have some control over those who 
operate in this market, particularly when there is absence of national 
legislation and/or regulation. This is an important point which offers 
probity to our proposal for a closer cooperation between external reg-
ulation and self-regulation, regarding the activities of football agents.
15 2015 FIFA Regulations on football intermediaries. In addition, 
the applicant must pay a registration fee of £600. The same applies to 
registered lawyers.
 The International Sports Law Journal
1 3
date, $1.59 billion was paid as commissions to club agents.16 
Our readers may also wish to compare this with the £66 
million figure spent on agents in the 2007–2008 season.17
3.1  The 2008 regulations
The 2008 revision of the regulations on football agents pro-
duced considerable developments and paved the ground for 
the deregulation that FIFA was looking for. Although the 
obligation of agents to pass an examination, remained in 
place, FIFA introduced the principle of ‘impeccable repu-
tation’ (only natural persons)18 that agents had to show 
they possessed and, upon meeting with such requirement, 
national federations would issue licences to agents who met 
with the criteria. This was the starting point for FIFA’s inten-
tion to deregulate the business of football agents and made 
it clear that it was the national federations’ responsibility to 
license football agents (although several agents continued, 
euphemistically, to use the term ‘FIFA agent’—and some 
of them still do, the truth of the matter remains that there is 
no such thing as a ‘FIFA agent’). All other basic provisions 
remained, by and large, the same, with a notable focus on 
FIFA’s attempt to maintain specific standards and ensur-
ing that players are not exploited and that financial records 
and/or payments are kept and monitored. For example, the 
2008 Regulations created a requirement for a legal guardian 
to sign the representation contract of a minor,19 whereas 
the agent was required to file a copy of the representation 
contract with the relevant national federation,20 including 
all the details of the contractual relationship (names, dates, 
signatures, duration, representation, jurisdiction, etc.).21
Despite the presence of all these basic but important con-
tractual considerations, as well as the licensing process and 
the examination in place (at least for some federations world-
wide), the principle of ‘impeccable reputation’ continued to 
create an enormous and unjustified subjectivity around dif-
ferent federations. Add insult to injury, such principle, was 
applied in very unequal and arbitrary terms around different 
jurisdictions and confirmed that a ‘federal system’ of dereg-
ulation and decentralisation was not going to be successful. 
The undersigned, witnessed far too many situations (either 
as legal counsel or agent) where the principle of ‘impeccable 
reputation,’ if applied purposefully and appropriately, would 
have allowed for the striking off of many agents in specific 
jurisdictions. In addition to this argument, one must not dis-
miss at face value the fact that one of the reasons the regula-
tory framework remained ineffective is not because the regu-
lations lacked strength, but rather because their execution 
has been arbitrary, capricious and, on certain occasions, non-
existent. On at least two occasions, the author was the recipi-
ent of the actions of two agents who, on both occasions, 
attempted to incite a breach of a representation contract, 
with the view to luring away the author’s clients. When the 
author complained to the relevant national federation (and 
to FIFA), the culprits were simply cautioned.22 Similarly, 
the author represented (before relevant disciplinary Tribu-
nals) several football agents who complained of incitement 
to breach and breach of a valid mandate of representation by 
unauthorised third-party agents. On such occasions it was 
evident that such third-party unauthorised agents attempted 
to approach players, who were under a valid mandate of rep-
resentation with other agents and persuade them to breach 
their existing mandate. Regrettably, this is a situation that 
occurs regularly, and it does so, because of the lack of appro-
priate regulation and application of sanctions against the 
perpetrators. It is respectfully submitted that this is, perhaps, 
the biggest problem in the regulation of football agents and 
one which violates, considerably, the contractual stability 
that both FIFA and UEFA wish to instil in the professional 
relationships between the different stakeholders.
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that it is this lack 
of appropriate execution of the relevant regulations and the 
lack of sanctions against perpetrators that made the entry to 
the profession even more attractive and contributed to the 
continuation of the present situation.23
23 Although there is a contention that football agency does not give 
rise to a profession, the author respectfully disagrees with such con-
tention.
16 See Table 1—FIFA TMS “Intermediaries in International Trans-
fers” 2017 Ed.
17 Kelso, P. 2009. ‘Premier League Wages Soar as Agents Paid £66 
million.’ Daily Telegraph, June 4.
18 Article 6.1 of the 2008 Regulations.
19 Article 19.2 of the 2008 FIFA Regulations.
20 Article 19.6 of the 2008 FIFA Regulations.
21 Article 19.5 of the 2008 FIFA Regulations.
22 Both agents still practice with one of them being constantly in the 
public eye for a number of activities connected with his profession.
Table 1  FIFA/TMS 
‘Intermediaries in International 
Transfers’ 2017 ed.
England 489.9
Italy 343.8
Portugal 161.1
Germany 145.6
Spain 121.7
France 61.4
Belgium 31.4
Russia 30.7
Wales 29.3
Croatia 19.9
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3.2  The 2015 regulations
The introduction of the 2015 Regulations on football agents 
created a comprehensive form of deregulation. This is evi-
dent from the clear acknowledgement produced by FIFA, 
outlining its intention to do so and explaining the reasons.24 
In essence, FIFA acknowledged that the 2008 set of regula-
tions on football agents did not work and explained that this 
failure relates to the fact that only 25–30% of licensed agents 
are responsible for players’ transfers. The author respectfully 
disagrees with such contention and would like to re-enforce 
the point that had FIFA maintained a tight monitoring pro-
cess on agents’ activities and enforced strictly and indis-
criminately its regulatory framework against unscrupulous 
agents, there would be no need for any new set of regula-
tions, let alone for a comprehensive form of deregulation.
With this in mind, let us summarise the 2015 FIFA Regu-
lations on football agents:
• The preamble to the regulations introduces the first 
change that relates to the term applicable to those 
involved in football transfers. It states: ‘A natural or legal 
person who, for a fee or free of charge, represents players 
and/or clubs in negotiations with a view to concluding an 
employment contract or represents clubs in negotiations 
with a view to concluding a transfer agreement.’ Please 
note that legal persons can now enter into transactions 
and as the author explains below, this potentially opens 
the way for further malpractice, particularly where the 
legal person involved in the transaction is a company 
registered overseas.
• The most notable change relates to the abolition of the 
licensing system.25 National football federations are 
no longer required to have a licensing system and the 
only requirement relates to a registration system, where 
national federations are only required to put in place a 
registration system through which ‘intermediaries’ are 
registered for every individual transaction they are 
involved in, whether it is with a club or with a player 
[emphasis added].
• Another notable recommendation (as opposed to a man-
datory provision) relates to the remuneration of agents, 
which states that agents should not receive more than 3% 
of the player’s basic gross income for the duration of the 
contract (3% of the transfer fee when the agent has been 
engaged on behalf of the club).26 In practice, it is hardly 
ever the case that an agent would claim a 3% fee in rela-
tion to a transaction. (From the author’s experience, fees 
may range from 5% to 18%.) In addition, it is the author’s 
opinion that if such a recommendation were to receive a 
mandatory nature, it would highly likely be challenged 
before courts and it is almost certain that it would fall 
foul of Articles 101 and 102 on distortion of competition 
and abuse of a dominant market position.27
• Another amendment which causes immense criticism 
relates to the requirement of those agents of ‘impecca-
ble reputation’ to ensure that they have no relationships 
that could lead to a ‘conflict of interest.’ Our respectful 
submission on this point is that this situation gives rise to 
a ‘much ado about nothing’ argument. In addition, well-
publicised examples indicate the prevalence of situations 
that FIFA is trying to stop.28
Considering the above (at this juncture), our research 
data, below, indicate that after over three years into the 
application of this new set of regulations, the problems 
have become even greater. To this effect, a comprehensive 
argument can be made that the lack of barriers to individu-
als who are unskilled, untrained and lack knowledge of the 
relevant regulations, are all elements that have a tendency 
of making the problem more serious. Such elements could 
potentially damage not only the image of sport, but they may 
create irreparable situations of negligence involving football 
players and/or clubs. In addition to this argument, the intro-
duction, by FIFA, of relevant regulations that allow commer-
cial entities to enter into agency transactions, now creates 
a wider and increasing field of tax avoidance schemes and 
poses a threat to the financial stability of several stakehold-
ers in the sport. In this light, it is the author’s respectful 
submission that there is no reasonable or compelling justifi-
cation for this deregulation, as in essence, such deregulation 
damages the image of sport as a whole.
Further, another element of the 2015 Regulations, which 
creates a procedural limitation, relates to the ability (or lack 
of) of litigants to use available appellate proceedings. One 
of the most important aspects of the procedural and substan-
tive advantages the discipline of sports law may entertain 
in this area of practice, centres on the choice of arbitration 
litigants may have and the choice of the appropriate dispute 
resolution forum. It is evident from a purposeful interpreta-
tion of the current regulations that FIFA has a preference 
for national federations to deal with national disputes (many 
24 See Marco Villiger, FIFA’s Legal Director in the EU Conference 
on Sports Agents, Brussels, 9-10 November 2011, http://ec.europ 
a.eu/asset s/eac/sport /libra ry/studi es/final -repor t-eu-confe rence -sport 
s-agent s.pdf.
25 Article 11.2 of FIFA’s Regulations Working with Intermediaries.
26 Article 7 of FIFA’s Regulations Working with Intermediaries.
27 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012/C 326/01.
28 See The Guardian, 10 May 2017, https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/
footb all/2017/may/10/mino-raiol a-manch ester -unite d-paul-pogba .
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national federations do not allow for appeals to CAS).29 
FIFA has, however, also left a window open for itself, 
which allows it to intervene in national disputes when there 
is a need for further sanctions. There is, however, ample 
evidence to suggest that the plethora of disputes, the lack 
of resources and personnel and other political reasons in 
the decision making of national federations, may not allow 
national federations to apply and execute such regulations in 
an effective and efficient manner. In such situation, litigants 
may find themselves short of a remedial avenue, as FIFA 
has created a jurisdictional limitation where parties have 
no possible avenues for appeals to the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport (CAS). This lacuna clearly illustrates such juris-
dictional issues litigants may face, particularly where they 
are unhappy with a decision at national level. Unless there 
is a specific agreement at national level, which allows for an 
appeal to CAS (and usually there is not), and/or FIFA has 
decided to intervene and reached a decision (in which case 
litigants may appeal it to CAS), CAS applications may be 
restricted because of the described jurisdictional limitations.
4  Our proposals: the way forward
It is not the author’s intention to appear pedantic, nor is 
there an attempt, with the present work, to underestimate 
the professionals in this discipline. It is important, how-
ever, to recognise (and our research suggests so) that there 
is a significant and, rather, increasing number of unskilled, 
untrained and unqualified agents, dealing with complicated 
and highly sensitive matters that determine the livelihood of 
professional players. Like in any other highly skilled profes-
sion, there is a need for an academic and vocational training 
stage, where professional responsibility is clearly explained 
to and applied by those who wish to enter the profession.
In the premises, it is submitted that the relationship 
between a football player and an agent is based on confi-
dence and trust and the advice given to the player, particu-
larly where there is a long-term contract with serious conse-
quences for the party signing it, may give rise to negligence 
and cause loss and damage to the player. In such instance, 
one would be hard pressed to accept the damage and/or 
sweep it under the carpet. More interestingly, the question 
may arise as to who is going to pick up the bill and how, if 
the agent concerned has no insurance and/or has no income 
to meet a claim against him/her.
It follows, therefore, that an appropriate system of regu-
lation is needed, to ensure that the rights of all parties to 
commercial transactions involving the transfer of players are 
secured, and that the system in place, guarantees that the 
individuals involved are properly qualified to advise on such 
commercial transactions.
In summary, and for the reasons explained below, we 
propose the introduction of Qualification Criteria and we 
recommend that only when such Qualification Criteria have 
been met, a licence to practise should be issued:
4.1  Qualification criteria: process
The diagram30 illustrates the process upon which we recom-
mend that any new regulations must be created and executed. 
This process also illustrates our recommendations for the 
re-introduction of a licensing system, but with pre-existing 
strict qualification criteria. We also recommend that such 
process is monitored and supervised by independent profes-
sional bodies, operating at a national level, with the coop-
eration of national federations and independent scientific 
Fig. 1  Academic & Training 
Process
30 See Fig. 1.
29 In the UK, the FA has created the Rule K Arbitration, which offers 
parties an appropriate dispute resolution forum.
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councils. The membership of such professional bodies must 
be comprised of sporting officials and scientific/academic 
personnel unconnected to the administration and/or gov-
ernance of football at national or international level. Such 
membership would ensure transparency at national level, 
integrity, consistency and equality in the licensing system 
and it would, above all, ensure that only qualified individu-
als are permitted to practise the profession of football agent. 
As we explain below, there is a compelling justification for 
the re-introduction of the licensing system and our recom-
mendation is that FIFA must also play an important role of 
contribution towards a monitoring system. In the premises, 
it is submitted that FIFA has a wealthy existence in terms of 
finances and part of its funding to its members must include 
financial assistance towards the creation and running of such 
professional bodies. This would also ensure that FIFA’s 
workload remains light,31 where national dispute resolution 
mechanisms are concerned.
4.2  The process: academic and vocational training, 
examination and licensing
The first stage in the licensing process should include the 
necessary academic and vocational training for professionals 
who wish to practise as football agents. This is an important 
and necessary stage of qualification, which ensures that the 
individuals involved have the depth and breadth of knowl-
edge, as well as the skills and training to advise clients in a 
confident, comprehensive, competent and professional man-
ner. As our Research Data 1 and 2 below indicate, many cur-
rent acting football agents lack the appropriate and necessary 
knowledge of the current applicable regulations. This is an 
area of concern as we explain below.
It follows, therefore, that the academic training of football 
agents is a necessary pre-condition for a successful licens-
ing process. Such academic training must include a com-
prehensive introduction of compulsory modules in football 
law, with emphasis on contract law, employment law, law 
of tort (negligence), professional ethics and general princi-
ples of law. In addition, academic training must be followed 
by the necessary vocational training, where candidates are 
introduced into case studies, with real-life clients and dis-
putes arising out of the expanding discipline of football law 
(and the game of football). There are a number of Institu-
tions around the world offering such clinical and applied 
courses, with emphasis on the relationship between players 
and agents, although, in the author’s opinion, FIFA must 
either create specific courses on such training, or promote 
and accredit existing ones that satisfy quality criteria.
The successful completion of such academic and voca-
tional training will lead candidates towards an expertise in 
football law and upon successful examination of the afore-
mentioned subjects, indemnity insurance must be obtained. 
Once such insurance has been obtained by the successful 
candidates, the relevant professional body should issue the 
certificate of qualification, register the successful candidate 
Fig. 2  Research Data 1
31 Quite possibly this is one of the major concerns for FIFA and 
the reasoning for a decision to de-regulate the profession of football 
agents.
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in the register of practising football agents and issue the 
necessary licence to practise.
The necessity of such stringent and strict qualification 
criteria must not be underestimated, nor must be dismissed 
at face value. The arguments outlined above, as well as our 
research and its empirical data in the next few lines, illus-
trate clearly the reasons for the creation of a comprehensive 
regulatory framework, based on a solid legal foundation. It 
is only when such strict qualification criteria are met, that 
public confidence in the governance of football agents can 
be restored. In the following lines, our readers will examine 
and evaluate our research findings that confirm the need for 
the introduction of our proposals.
As it was explained in the methodology section, our 
research was conducted over a period of 28 months in six 
European countries with questionnaires sent to registered 
football agents in their respective countries. The answers 
were anonymous, and they were collected and received by 
independent third parties. There was a remarkable response, 
where in all instances, 72.6% of the totality of agents 
returned their questionnaires. This confirms, to a very large 
extent, the validity of the data received and evaluated by us.
4.3  Research data 132
In the first analytical set of data that we can reveal, the fol-
lowing important question was asked: ‘Do you fully know/
understand the FIFA Regulations on Intermediaries?’ The 
findings from the response received are somehow indicative 
of the current trend in this discipline and confirm that a large 
number of current football agents do not fully understand 
the current regulations. In some countries, our data suggest 
that almost 3 out of 10 agents lack such knowledge. Given 
the importance of the advice and the trust and confidence 
a player places on an agent, we conclude that the current 
system of deregulation causes a significant problem, as it 
may create serious ramifications not only for the professional 
people involved, but also for the sport as a whole. In essence, 
the lack of knowledge of the relevant regulations may lead 
some agents to produce an erroneous advice to their clients 
and create contractual problems of an irreversible nature. In 
one of our interviews, one of the respondent-agents admit-
ted that they did not fully understand some of the regula-
tions, but they did not wish to show such lack of knowledge 
and understanding to their clients. Similarly, they felt that 
seeking the advice of a legally qualified professional was a 
lengthy process and an expensive one. They also admitted 
that they were prepared to take the risk and advise their 
clients, as the profit out of the relevant transaction was too 
large to ignore and it was worth the risk. The conclusion 
here is self-evident and one that cannot be ignored by the 
regulators.
Fig. 3  Research Data 2
32 See Fig. 2.
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4.4  Research data 233
In the second set of empirical data, the participants were 
asked the following question: ‘Do you have knowledge of 
Contract Law and/or Employment Law?’ Again, these par-
ticular data indicate a serious problem, as in some coun-
tries almost 4 out of 10 agents confirm that they have no 
knowledge of such legal disciplines. It is submitted that as 
the relationship between players and clubs is a contractual/
employment one and the advice given by agents to players 
has as a subject matter such contractual relationship, it is 
not far-fetched or illogical to suggest that lack of knowl-
edge of these specific areas of law may also create serious 
ramifications for those involved. Both the interviews we con-
ducted and the responses to our survey identified important 
data regarding pre-advice and post-advice issues that may 
arise. In this instance, 23% of the respondents stated that 
they would consult a qualified lawyer in case they feel they 
need assistance with issues of contract law/employment law, 
whereas another 11% of the respondents stated that they pre-
fer to take the risk and advise their clients even though they 
had no knowledge of the relevant law. A smaller 5% of the 
respondents stated that they did not need such knowledge 
as they relied on the buying and selling clubs to confirm 
all issues.
4.5  Research data 334
In the third set of empirical data, a very important question 
was asked: ‘Do you have a valid Mandate of Representation 
with your Clients?’ The data gathered from the responses 
to this question are most alarming and forms, perhaps, 
one of the most worrying aspects regarding the practice of 
football agency. The data confirm that a large number of 
agents currently operate without a valid contract (mandate) 
of representation with their clients. This creates not only a 
legal problem, but also an ethical one, which exposes not 
only the ineffectiveness of self-regulation, but primarily, it 
exposes the players who deal and negotiate with such foot-
ball agents.35 From these particular data, our readers may 
elicit that, in some countries, almost half of the practising 
agents operate without a valid contract of representation 
with their clients. Given that FIFA places enormous reli-
ance on contractual stability and wishes to maintain such 
contractual stability at all times, it is important to suggest 
that such outcome exposes one of the routes to the prob-
lem and undermines not only contractual stability, but also 
FIFA’s authority (and subsequently the one of national fed-
erations) to properly regulate football agents and assert its 
authority on them.36 In some countries, a staggering 40% 
Fig. 4  Research Data 3
33 See Fig. 3.
34 See Fig. 4.
35 From experience, it is sometimes the case that several players do 
not wish to be tied up to a contract with an agent.
36 This is also true, particularly at national level where an increas-
ing number of cases before national courts can be identified. See, for 
example, the UK experience - Breach of contract and/or inducement 
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of the respondents admitted that they do not hold a valid 
mandate of representation with their clients (despite FIFA’s 
clear instructions on the point). An alarming 18% stated 
that they do not do so, because there are no repercussions, 
whereas another 13% stated that their clients do not want 
such contractual obligation (mandate), and if the agents were 
to pressurise the players into signing one, they may lose such 
Fig. 5  Research Data 4
Fig. 6  Research Data 5
Footnote 36 (continued)
to breach: Anthony McGill v. The Sports and Entertainment Media 
Group (‘SEM’) [2016] EWCA Civ 1063; [2017] 1 WLR 989; Breach 
of fiduciary duty: Imageview Management Ltd v Jack [2009] EWCA 
Civ 63; [2009] 2 All E.R. 666.
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players from their representation. In one of the interviews we 
conducted with a Premier League manager, such manager 
acknowledged that they have dealt with unauthorised agents, 
simply because the player was to good to lose out on. On the 
question, of whether they (manager) understood the risk of 
clubs dealing with unauthorised agents, they explained that 
the club knew the risk, but still went on to authorise (the 
club) the transaction.
4.6  Research data 437
In the fourth set of empirical data, the following question 
was posed to the participants: ‘Do you follow the recom-
mended 3% benchmark fee suggested by FIFA?’ You may 
elicit from the responses that no further elaboration is 
required. Almost over 7 out of 10 football agents do not fol-
low such recommendation by FIFA. This could easily allow 
one to conclude, with respect, that FIFA’s recommendation 
here is much ado about nothing and it is equally evident that 
such recommendation is unworkable. The following data, 
however, reveal further evidence.
4.7  Research data 538
In the fifth set of empirical data, we posed the following 
question to the participants: ‘If the answer to the previous 
QUESTION is ‘No,’ what is the reason for not following 
the 3% benchmark?’ The data gathered from the responses 
are truly revealing of the mentality currently in place and 
justifies the argument that such suggested benchmark is 
unworkable. A closer examination, however, indicates that 
over 5 out of 10 agents do not follow such recommended 
benchmark because ‘it is not mandatory.’ This may generate 
the logical enquiry as to what the result would be, if such 
benchmark were to become mandatory. This remains to be 
seen, but in the author’s opinion (as it is explained above), 
even in the hypothetical scenario where the 3% benchmark 
applies, its compulsory operation would be short-lived for 
two important reasons: firstly, it may fall foul of current 
European competition law policy and secondly, the applica-
tion of such benchmark would create an arbitrary environ-
ment and one which would be evidently disproportionate and 
unequal between different players’ transfers (where agents’ 
fees are concerned).
5  Proposals continued: solutions
5.1  The future: financial transparency
Current public opinion resigns to the view that there is 
an enormous amount of money in the business of football 
and certain transactions involving football agents and sub-
sequent payments to them are illegal and unethical. With 
this in mind, we propose a rather radical approach in deal-
ing with payments to agents. It is submitted that financial 
Fig. 7  Sanctions a
37 See Fig. 5.
38 See Fig. 6.
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transparency, particularly in the current situation before 
FIFA, is regarded as one of the cornerstones of the so-called 
change in the governance of football agents. Much of the 
objection towards the incredibly high and inflated fees of 
football transfers is directed against the secrecy of payments 
towards agents. There are certain ways by which such pay-
ments may be hidden and, consequently, football authorities, 
as well as tax authorities, cannot determine with certainty 
the financial transparency required from all stakeholders. 
With the present work, we propose the creation of a mecha-
nism at national level, where all football clubs would deposit 
with their national federation, in advance, an estimate of the 
fees for licensed agents. This would mean that payments 
would become valid only via the national federation and only 
with the natural entity that can be identified in the transac-
tion. If the entity in the transaction is a commercial entity 
(something which the author opposes), there should be a 
requirement of a registered football agent acting for the com-
mercial entity and a clear identification of their role in the 
said transaction (whether they are paid agents or non-paid 
agents). In summary, we propose the following on the issue 
of financial transparency:
• Payments to agents via the National Federation.
• Clubs to deposit in advance intermediaries’ fees with the 
National Federation.
• Restrictions on commercial entities with registration in 
‘tax havens.’
• Identification of intermediaries with a valid registration 
(and their role in the transaction) if acting via a commer-
cial entity.
• Automatic tax deduction (agents’ fees) in the country of 
the purchasing club.
5.2  The future: sanctions against agents39
One of the important aspects of the current analysis relates 
to the lack of execution of the appropriate sanctions cur-
rently in place. This proposal is one of the most fundamen-
tals of the current work, as it identifies, and promotes, the 
state as an important player in the investigative stage of dis-
ciplinary proceedings against agents. One of the main prob-
lems with the current regulations concerns the inadequate or 
non-existent application of sanctions against unscrupulous 
agents. Lack of execution and application of rules creates a 
stigma and an anathema of the worst kind. One may argue 
that such proposal may lead towards a form of criminalisa-
tion, but equally an argument may be submitted that the cur-
rent nature of disciplinary law may lead us to conclude that 
there is an inevitable overlapping between the two, mainly 
because of the paternalistic basis that both kinds of regula-
tion have. In the author’s opinion, the fundamental basis of 
the problem is not the existence of strict rules, but, rather, 
the lack of effective and purposeful application of such rules.
In the premises, the current proposal suggests that exter-
nal regulation is necessary, particularly at the investigative 
stage of the disciplinary process, where the state may assist 
in the collection and evaluation of evidence against the per-
petrators. This is a necessary development, which must be 
Fig. 8  Sanctions b
39 See Fig. 7.
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inserted in the future set of regulations, as it would allow 
FIFA and the national federations to create a more sophis-
ticated and comprehensive disciplinary framework and one 
which would observe transparency, consistency, certainty 
and equality.
5.3  The future: sanctions against clubs40
Provided that there is a close cooperation between self-
regulation and external regulation (at the investigative 
Fig. 9  Sanctions c
Fig. 10  Solution
40 See Fig. 8.
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stage of the disciplinary process), where the evidence may 
be collected and evaluated with the assistance of the State, 
it is submitted that when such evidence indicates malprac-
tice on behalf of football clubs, sanctions must be applied, 
indiscriminately, against such clubs. Although one cannot 
argue that this is the rule (as opposed to the exception), 
nevertheless, there is an increasing number of football 
clubs, around Europe, who are prepared to complete trans-
actions with unlicensed and/or unscrupulous agents. This 
suggests that certain clubs are complicit in activities that 
go beyond the sphere of legality and, in essence, create an 
environment of regulatory breaches. It is not enough, how-
ever, to identify such breaches and simply state that clubs 
are responsible. Where the evidence meets the standard 
of proof, sanctions must be imposed against such clubs, 
ranging from a simple fine, to a transfer ban and deduction 
of points. Having produced several arguments on the point, 
we conclude that such sanctions may not run contrary to 
the principle of proportionality.
5.4  The future: sanctions against federations41
Similarly, an argument needs to be made on the importance 
of the role of national federations in the investigation and 
prosecution of offences. In the premises, it is submitted 
that when national federations fail to adequately prosecute 
offences and/or apply ‘home town’ decisions, the regulatory 
system becomes ineffective and witnesses another step on 
the ladder of illegality. At this juncture, we may also witness 
an exasperation of the situation as the aggrieved party may 
remain without a remedy in terms of continuation of the 
disciplinary process. This is particularly relevant in light of 
the current regulations, as FIFA explicitly diverts applica-
tion of regulatory responsibility, as well as judicial deci-
sion making, to national federations. The lack of remedies 
becomes even more serious a situation, given the lack of an 
appellate stage outside the national parameters (save where 
FIFA decides to intervene with its own decision making). 
This jurisdictional limitation, in conjunction with lack of 
sanctions at national level, makes the current regulations 
extremely ineffective and potentially irrelevant.
5.5  The future: solution42
In conclusion, it is proposed that an effective and workable 
solution to the problem would require a close cooperation 
between national federations and state authorities, particu-
larly at the investigative stage, where evidence needs to be 
collected and evaluated. As suggested above, it is proposed 
that an Independent Monitoring Committee must be cre-
ated at national level, comprising of experts (unconnected 
to the national federation) from self-regulation and exter-
nal regulation. Such committee will be responsible for the 
investigation, adjudication and application of the regulatory 
framework.
In line with the legal developments emanating from the 
European Court, FIFA must also work closely with state 
authorities, to ensure its regulatory framework is supported 
in areas that require a public response and assistance. It is 
true that in certain circumstances a private regulatory body 
such as FIFA must comply with national legislation (and 
where European countries are concerned, with EU law), par-
ticularly where employment and agency laws are concerned. 
As stated above, a number of countries are now commencing 
the creation of sport specific legislation for the activities 
of football agents, by taking into consideration correspond-
ing provisions from employment law and agency law (as 
they are incorporated into their national Statutes). Countries 
without such national legislation are encouraged to follow 
such example, to ensure that there is harmonisation, world-
wide, in the activities of football agents. This point was also 
addressed in the Piau case (as stated above) where it was 
acknowledged by the European Court that lack of specific 
national regulation/legislation, may create a necessity of 
qualitative restrictions in FIFA’s regulatory framework of 
football agents.
Similarly, an argument can be made that FIFA has a 
unique opportunity to re-gain effective regulatory control 
over the activities of football agents, with the required 
degree of legality and order. Although there are several 
competent and able football agents, there are also, regret-
tably, several unskilled and untrained agents, who enter the 
market with the sole intention of making a quick profit. The 
European Commission may feel that entry restrictions to 
individuals have the potential of violating EU competition 
law; however, the European Commission has also acknowl-
edged in the Piau case (as stated above) that it is important 
for a regulator to have some control over those who operate 
in this market, particularly when there is absence of national 
legislation and/or regulation. This is an important point 
which offers probity to our proposal for a closer cooperation 
between external regulation and self-regulation, regarding 
the activities of football agents.
Finally, FIFA must create a compulsory appellate level, 
where all disputes, on appeal from a national federation, 
are dealt with efficiently. A further appellate level to CAS 
must continue to exist also. This is an important procedural 
requirement which imposes necessary issues of safeguarding 
against abuse of power at national level and instances of mis-
carriages of justice. Such procedural requirement will also 
add further certainty and consistency in the advice offered to 
the different stakeholders in the regulation of football agents. 
41 See Fig. 9.
42 See Fig. 10.
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It would also strengthen FIFA’s legal framework and it will 
eliminate ‘home town’ decisions at national level.
6  Conclusion
It has been suggested, in this work, that there is an increasing 
need for cooperation between self-regulation and external 
regulation. Such is the importance of football for society 
that all consequences flowing from inadequate and ineffec-
tive regulation have the potential of damaging the image of 
sport and, therefore, instruct for a public, rather than a pri-
vate response. To this effect, it is also important to conclude 
that those governing the regulation of agents must arrive at 
a specific path and decide to follow it without diversions. 
When one of my students recently asked me where self-
regulation is going with this area of football law, I could 
not find a better answer than the one identified in one of 
Christopher Columbus’ writings (written on his attempts to 
discover America): ‘When I was travelling to America, I 
didn’t know where I was going; when I arrived in America I 
didn’t know where I were; when I left America, I didn’t know 
where I had been.’
It follows that the only solution to this increasing anath-
ema for self-regulation is a clear direction. The author is of 
the view that unscrupulous agents have no place in the sport 
of football and they must be eliminated. The current regula-
tory framework must be applied in a prudent and purposeful 
manner and all stakeholders involved must condemn unethi-
cal, immoral and illegal behaviour from such individuals43. 
More importantly, the different regulators in football must 
ensure they deal with complaints effectively and efficiently 
by applying the appropriate sanctions against such individu-
als. As prevention is always better than cure, it is submitted 
that agents must be qualified (based on the proposals in this 
work) and their regulation must, to a certain extent, be left 
to independent monitoring committees or the relevant state 
authorities (where collection and evaluation of evidence are 
concerned). It is only when tough and fair sanctions could 
apply against such individuals, that the problem of unscru-
pulous agents may be eliminated for ever.
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